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Abstract: With newly adopted Energy Law, market in Serbia will become more 
deregulated in following years. Price and quantities of energy traded will be 
formed through an open pool competition of several producers and consumers by 
market mechanism which tends to maximize welfare. Due to congestion some of 
this welfare will be lost. We are suggesting and discussing 5 market indicators to 
quantify changes arising in the dispatch with congestion constraints. 
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1 Introduction 
Regarding to the models of competition, electricity markets evolved from 
monopolies with no competition, to retail competition [1]. 
Traditionally, in Serbia, there was a typical vertically integrated utility at 
one and consumer at another side. The difference from a classical monopoly is 
in regulatory government board which is in charge of determining prize of 
electrical energy per kWh sold to the consumer. Since year 2005 and adoption 
of Energy Law 05, vertically integrated utility separated into generation and 
distribution. Generation company EPS owns all generation facilities while 
transmission company EMS owns all transmission and distribution facilities.  
With adoption of new Law of Energy 2011 there is more competition to be 
seen in the future. Besides bilateral and balancing market, there is a space for 
open electricity market under the rules defined by regulator body proposed by 
the government. The open market participants are: Genco’s, Disco’s, Transco’s, 
retailers, consumers and operator of open market but with certain specificities. 
These specificities are in time frame and open market in Serbia will be 
introduced sequentially. The transition to the open market will be accomplished 
in tree steps. Firstly, from year 2013 the largest consumers attached directly to 
transmission system will be capable of participating in the open market. 
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Secondly, middle consumers attached to 0.4  kV or 10  kV are market 
participants from year 2014 and finally, from year 2015 all consumers 
participate in the open market [2]. 
Once new market is established the price of the electricity will change. 
Consumers are interested to receive demanded quantity of electricity at the best 
prize while producers are interested to sell at the highest prices. Price may differ 
at the ground of different generation technologies. Prices at consumer side are 
demand bids. They are usually introduced to illustrate Genco’s potential of 
obtaining desired amount of energy at the location of the consumer. 
Transportation of electricity is obtained at economic grounds, which means that 
no electricity will be transferred if the price at consumer side is less than price 
of generation plus price of transportation and some additional welfare for all 
participants. Bids at consumers’ side should be higher than the highest price at 
generation side in order to account for the transmission. Usually, there is 
something like the retail/Transco/Disco operator in between, which is also 
adding to the price, but this example is going to be simplified to producer-
consumer scenario without loosing the big picture. The optimum is achieved at 
the intersection of supply and demand curves and it is called the maximum 
welfare [3]. 
In order to fulfill maximum welfare, we are suggesting applying linear 
optimization model. We model the energy market with several producers and 
consumers as a dispatch problem with demand bids [3]. Every consumer can 
buy from every producer or many producers. We assume that external trade is in 
balance, while quantities of exported and imported energy are equal. Solution to 
the dispatch problem with demand bids is obtained via Excel Solver 2007 [4]. 
Congestion occurs due to an operating condition that causes limit violations 
of one or more components in the system network [5]. We are looking at 
congestion cost at the side of producer and consumer. Furthermore, we are 
suggesting five market indicators to answer a question: what is impact of 
network congestions to the market clearing price (MCP) and market clearing 
quantity (MCQ) in the deregulated market? We are adding constraints to the 
transmission network to find if the customers are obliged to pay higher prices 
because of congestion, which occurs occasionally in an open assessed 
transmission network. Additionally, we are simulating the open market 
mechanism trying to maximize global welfare (W) and to quantify deadweight 
loss (DL) [1]. 
Finally, we are going to perform sensitivity analysis of the optimization 
problem and show how to obtain MCP. Deregulated Serbian Electricity Market Optimal Dispatch with Congestion Constraints 
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2 Method 
Problem of optimal customer prizes is formulated as a dispatch problem 
with demand bids. We are looking at all Genco’s and their offer prices and at 
consumers demand bids to find the MCP in order to achieve maximum welfare. 
In order to achieve maximum welfare at the open electricity market we will 
determine the values of  X  matrix, by using Excel Solver. 
 Furthermore, in order to explain effects of congestion to the MCP we have 
modified the dispatch problem by adding: 
1.  Transportation matrix  X  to the dispatch problem with demand bids; 
2.  New constraints to simulate congestion of the one line  1 Z  and  2 Z , 
shown in Fig. 1. 
Mathematical formulation: Chose  ij x  to maximize objective function: 
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where  i P  and  ,1 , 2 , , i Qi s = …  are prices and quantities of energy at the supply 
side,  i P  and  ,1 , 2 , , j Qj b = …  are demand bids and quantities of energy at the 
demand side,  ij x  are values of matrix  X , the energy transported from Genco i  
to the constumer  j,  i S  is the maximum offered energy at the Genco,  i D  is the 
maximum energy that may be sold to the consumer,  , 1,2, , j CON j b = … , is a 
congestion on the line from the Genco i  to all consumers. I. Batas Bjelić, I. Škokljev 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 1 – Modified demand dispatch with demand bids: (a) Table, (b) Solver parameters. 
 
Cells B3:C8 show the quantity and price of supply offers to sell energy in 
increasing order and cells H11:L12 show demanded quantities and price bids 
for energy at consumers’ side in decreasing order. Choice variables are in cells 
H3:L8. Cells E3:E8 are accepted supply offers at Genco i  to all consumers in 
open market that are buying its energy. Cells H10:E10 are accepted demand 
bids of customer j from all Genco’s that are selling energy.  
Summations in (1) are calculated in cells M9 and F13, while their 
difference, market welfare and objective function are in cell O13. Constraint 
given in (2) showing that energy cannot be stored is calculated in cells M10 and 
E9 and formulated as a third constraint in Solver parameters Fig. 1b. First two 
constraints are (3) and (4). Constraints illustrating congestion  1 Z  and  2 Z  are 
cells O9 and O10. Additionally, choice variables should be nonnegative. 
 3  Results and Discussion 
Basic scenario is model of open market with 6 Genco’s and 5 consumers. 
Prices and quantities are chosen randomly. Scenarios to illustrate changes in 
open market with market indicators are shown in Table 1. 
Fig. 2. shows how changes in demand and supply affect market indicators. 
Fig. 2a showing that decreasing in demand at the marginal prices is higher than Deregulated Serbian Electricity Market Optimal Dispatch with Congestion Constraints 
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MCP leads to the decrease in MCP and MCQ. Since consumers are not anymore 
interested to bid energy at high prices, global welfare is decreased and 
deadweight loss is positive. Changes at supply side are shown in Fig.  2b. 
Increasing in quantity of energy at supply side on generators with lower 
marginal costs than MCP decreases MCP and increases MCQ. Global welfare is 
rising while deadweight loss is negative. 
Table 1 
Market indicators for base case and different scenarios. 
Change in  Congestion at 
 Base  case 
supply demand supply  demand 
Rate [kWh]  0  35  –40  20  20 
MPC [c€/kWh]  9  7.5  7.5  10.5  8 
MCW [kWh]  110  115  80  110  100 
W [c€]  745  857.5  530  670  645 
DL [c€]  0  –112.5  215  75  100 
SP [c€/kWh]  0  3.2  –5.4  –3.8  –5.0 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 2 – (a) Decrease in demand; (b) Increase in supply. 
 
Fig. 3 shows effects of congestion. Congestion may happen at both sides 
when flows of energy at open market are constrained with network capacity or 
network failure. Congestion at generator with lower marginal cost then MCP is 
shown at Fig. 3a. As a result, MCP raises, MCQ is constant while the global 
welfare is decreased by the deadweight loss. Scenario with the congestion at the 
demand side with higher marginal costs than the MCP is shown at Fig. 3b. In 
this scenario MPC, MCQ and global welfare decrease, while the deadweight 
loss is positive. I. Batas Bjelić, I. Škokljev 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 3 – Congestion: (a) Supply side; (b) Demand side. 
 
3.1 Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is a byproduct of optimization in Excel Solver. The 
most valuable product of this procedure is the MCP obtaining procedure. The 
MCP is obtained at the intersection of the supply and demand curves. All 
constraints have its shadow prices. The MCP is associated with the shadow 
price of quantity of energy procured at the market. The market clearing quantity 
(MCQ) is shown at Fig. 4. It is also known as the marginal price of energy. It 
shows how much consumer must pay for the additional kWh of energy and the 
price of additional kWh of energy to be sold by Genco’s. 
 
Fig. 4 – Sensitivity analysis of constraints. Deregulated Serbian Electricity Market Optimal Dispatch with Congestion Constraints 
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Another product of optimization is a reduced cost for choice (decision) 
variables. A reduced cost for offers or bids not selected is les or equal zero. It 
shows how the objective function is changed if variable is chosen. Since this is 
a maximization problem, variables with lower negative reduced costs are more 
likely not to be chosen.  
With increasing in production of 35 kWh we are achieving global welfare 
rising for 112.5 c€ showing that the shadow price of production is 3.2 c€ per 
kWh of a newly constructed production unit. Shadow prices of congestion at 
supply and demand side are shown in last column of Table 1. 
4 Conclusion 
The process of deregulation in Serbia will eventually result in opening of 
the electricity market, in the year 2015. Due to possible transmission 
congestions and capacity shortages, market clearing price will not always be 
formed freely, which might result in the deadweight loss and in declining 
instead of the expected increase of the global welfare. With possible less 
demand for energy the market clearing price could decline, as well as the global 
welfare and the market clearing quantity. Investments in new generation and 
transmission might result in lower market clearing prices and larger global 
welfare. 
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